This paper will be devoted to ontology, metaontology, and metametaphysics. Ontology is often defined as the branch of metaphysics that investigates what there is. We'll begin by looking at a range of central debates within ontology. These debates concern the existence of holes, the composition and persistence of material objects, and the existence and nature of fictional characters and musical works.

We'll then transition to an extended investigation of metaontology, which is the study of the methods and aims of ontology. The defining debate within metaontology is that between Willard Van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap, and this debate will be our starting point. Next, we'll discuss Eli Hirsch's quantifier variance, which is inspired by Carnap's work and represents a significant challenge to many standard ontological debates. Hirsch's main contemporary opponent is Ted Sider, who defends ontological realism. We'll have a look at Sider's critique of quantifier variance and his corresponding defence of ontological realism. As a follow-up to the Hirsch-Sider debate, we'll consider Amie Thomasson's easy approach. This approach is meant to deliver metaontological results that are similar to those of quantifier variance, but as we'll see, Thomasson's methodology differs importantly from that of Hirsch.

To close the paper, we'll consider three metametaphysical topics which pertain to the broader aims and methods of metaphysics. The first is grounding. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that instead of focusing so intently on the ontological question 'What is there?' metaphysicians should focus on the question 'What grounds what?' In thinking through this metametaphysical position, we'll consider what grounding is meant to be and what sort of explanatory work it is meant to do within metaphysics.

Secondly, we'll consider the role that cross-cultural enquiry should play in metaphysics. Justine Kingsbury (a proud member of the Waikato Philosophy programme) argues in a forthcoming essay that Western metaphysicians should endorse a kind of realism about taniwha, which are powerful water creatures in Māori pūrākau (traditional narratives). She predicts that this conclusion will strike most Western metaphysicians as being rather surprising, given e.g. that English-language news coverage of taniwha in New Zealand tends to be either hostile or mocking. In thinking through Kingsbury's discussion, we'll consider some significant methodological issues, including the ways in which the value of cross-cultural respect should inform cross-cultural metaphysics.

Lastly, we'll discuss a piece by Sally Haslanger that has become a classic example of feminist metaphysics. In this paper, Haslanger offers analyses of race and gender that exemplify an approach to metaphysics that she calls the analytical approach. We'll reflect on the ways in which the analytical approach differs from the other metametaphysical positions that we've surveyed and on whether it is the best approach to take when analyzing notions such as race and gender.